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Subject: Change in the DAS

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To: "Scott.Berrier2@dodiis.mil" <Scott.Berrier2@dodiis.mil>

Cc: "[REDACTED]" >

LTG Berrier,

Thank you for continuing to take appreciable measures to help effect much-needed leadership and cultural change in our DAS. This week's personnel actions mark a step in the right direction, but the journey is far from over. [REDACTED] was unfit for her duties in every respect, having committed multiple reprisals, acts of retribution and abuses of authority; all while establishing a Stasi-like spy network in which DAS [REDACTED] members actively usurped the chain of command in order to collect and report on fellow Americans. Her reprehensible actions, and resultant mission impacts, served as a discredit to herself, her organization, and her nation. I, and many attachés, applaud her removal; I know I speak for many in saying it was long overdue. However, [REDACTED] was not the cancer that plagues the organization, rather, it was the leadership culture of the DAS which allowed her to not only survive, but to "thrive" in the Agency. [REDACTED] operated unabatedly for years, oppressing her subordinates, threatening others, and disrupting the personal and professional lives of scores of professional, dedicated Americans. This begs the question: how could this have happened? I submit to you it is due to the following factors:

DAS Leaders consistently refused to intervene, despite being alerted time and time again to [REDACTED]'s conduct

[REDACTED] was made aware of [REDACTED]'s transgressions over the course of months, if not years, via climate assessments, IG complaints and End of Tour reports. Time and time again, he carried out no substantive actions in response. This further validated [REDACTED] and enabled her to continue to conduct herself in such an ignominious manner, especially given her position and rank, not only affecting the lives of hard-working and dedicated Americans, but doing so at the expense of the mission.

The DAS purports a carrot-and-stick leadership model, taking advantage of leverage it has over its members

This mantra begins on day 1 of JMAS. Attachés and Ops staff are thoroughly screened and vetted by their Services; most times having gone through a year-long process in order to be selected. It is a prestigious selection and, potentially, an incredible job. DAS leaders are fully aware of this and they use this knowledge as leverage over their members. While reviewing the inputs I was provided for the report on "Toxicity in the DAS," the theme of carrot-and-stick approach appeared several times. This is how OPSCOs are coerced into spying on attachés, it is how attachés are instructed to "not rock the boat" and are punished when they "do." The result: a DAS civilian cabal that prioritizes self and job preservation over mission support and accomplishment and leaders who are able to conduct themselves as such because of the paralyzing fear they instill in DAS personnel. For too long, DAS members, who lived under constant fear of retribution, accepted the inefficacy of DAS leadership and caustic personnel such as [REDACTED] because to raise their concerns was to invite inevitable retribution in the form of canceled assignments, recalls to D.C., subpar fitness reports, disrupted personal lives; the list goes on.

The comport double-standard

Throughout JMAS, instructors preach to the student body "comport yourselves as diplomats." Unfortunately, the respect is oftentimes not reciprocated by the DAS vis-à-vis attachés and Ops staff. I recently wrote an email to the Service directorates that oversee their respective attachés and reported to them that their personnel, which they have hand-selected for very high-visibility/high-impact positions, deserve to be treated with the courtesy and respect commensurate with the position. This has not been the DAS nor JMAS mantra and it furthers the de facto acceptance of

subjugation of attachés under DAS oppressors.

An IG system incapable of swift action

As of today, there are at least three DIA/IG Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations listing [REDACTED] as a subject. These were filed in [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. The glacial progress on these investigations, of which have resulted in victims suffering career-altering or ending personnel actions, is simply unacceptable offering no recompense for victims, but also, in turn, fails to deter future would-be culprits.

In reviewing the report “Toxicity Within the DAS,” and forthcoming IG reports of investigation, you will undoubtedly note that [REDACTED] did not operate alone in promulgating the toxic leadership model of the organization. Other members, many of whom still serve in the DAS, from Geodivision chiefs, to Branch chiefs, to OPSCOs, to staff, were all too eager to participate in, and propagate, the rule by fear and retribution. It is because of these outstanding threats to mission effectiveness and national security that I will continue to work with IG and Congressional elements to bring about *cultural* change. Through continued personnel, policy, and leadership changes, can we recapture the prestige and full mission-effectiveness of the DAS.

In closing, I would like to acknowledge the 30+ DAS personnel who had the moral courage to stand up against toxicity in the Agency. Many of them did not enjoy the ‘luxury’ I did of not working under the threat of DAS retribution, so the fact that they were willing to accept significant risk and speak out against wrongdoing within their organization speaks not only to their character, but to their dedication to the Agency, the mission, and the defense of the nation. For that, they are owed a debt of gratitude.

Thank you again for your engagement on these critical issues.

Respectfully,
Lt Col Ryan Sweazey

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